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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this appeal, we must decide whether section 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) 
(1988), mandates federal preemption of state contract and tort 
claims brought by collective bargaining unit members based on 
promises and misrepresentations of job security by their 
employer, Trans Penn Wax Corporation.  Trans Penn contends these 
claims are preempted because they relate to mandatory subjects of 
collective bargaining and require interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement.  Trans Penn also claims the 
district court abused its discretion in remanding the case to 
state court after the employees withdrew their sole federal cause 
of action. 
 The employees brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Crawford County, Pennsylvania, alleging breach of contract, 
fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), by 
Trans Penn and its corporate affiliates, Astor Wax Corporation 
  
and ABI Corporation.  The employees alleged Trans Penn induced 
them to decertify their union through contractual promises of job 
security and later breached those promises by terminating them.  
Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The employees then 
sought leave to delete their RICO claims and have the case 
remanded back to state court.  The district court granted their 
motion and then denied Trans Penn's subsequent motion for 
reconsideration.  McCandless v. Trans Penn Wax Corp., 840 F. 
Supp. 371 (W.D. Pa. 1993). 
 Trans Penn now petitions for a writ of mandamus 
directing the nominal respondent, Maurice Cohill, Jr., District 
Judge for the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, to rescind his order remanding this 
case to the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County, 
Pennsylvania and to exercise jurisdiction over the employees' 
claims.  We have jurisdiction to address this claim under the All 
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988).1 
 We hold that resolution of the employees' contract and 
tort claims is not substantially dependent upon an analysis of 
the collective bargaining agreement and therefore section 301 
does not require preemption.  We also find the district court 
                     
1
.   The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1651 provides in part: 
 
 (a) The Supreme Court and all courts 
established by Act of Congress may issue all 
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of 
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable 
to the usages and principles of law. 
  
acted within its sound discretion in remanding after the 
employees withdrew their federal claims.  We will deny the 
petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 I. 
 A. 
 Trans Penn is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the 
manufacture of industrial wax products in Titusville, 
Pennsylvania.  The Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Worker's 
International Union ("OCAWI") represented Trans Penn employees 
for the purpose of collective bargaining beginning in 1988.  On 
January 15, 1990, OCAWI and Trans Penn entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement in which the company recognized OCAWI as the 
exclusive representative of full-time employees at the Titusville 
plant.   
 On April 27, 1990, a majority of the bargaining unit 
members voted to decertify OCAWI as their bargaining 
representative.  The election was certified by the National Labor 
Relations Board on May 7, 1990.  On the eve of the 
decertification election, Trans Penn presented the employees with 
a written "contract" for employment and guarantee of job 
security.  The document is entitled "Guarantee" and states: 
 This is our PERSONAL GUARANTEE and your  
 LEGAL CONTRACT that you . . . will have a job 
 here . . . as long as you perform your work 
satisfactorily, follow our customary rules, 
and we are economically able to operate this 
institution successfully and work is 
available.  This GUARANTEE is given to you 
because of the FALSE UNION RUMOR that you 
will lose your job if the Union loses the 
  
election . . . .  This is our WRITTEN LEGAL 
CONTRACT AND GUARANTEE TO YOU . . . .   
 
App. at 62.   
 On October 30, 1991, Trans Penn terminated the six 
employees who are plaintiffs in this action, and later contracted 
with Manpower, Incorporated to provide temporary production 
workers.      
 B. 
 The employees filed a complaint in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Crawford County, Pennsylvania, alleging Trans Penn had 
committed: (1) breach of contract by terminating the "Guarantee"; 
(2) fraud in making false and misleading statements concerning 
the "Guarantee" upon which the employees relied in decertifying 
the union; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and 
(4) RICO violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).   
 Based on the employees' RICO claims, Trans Penn removed 
the action to the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania.  The employees then sought leave to 
withdraw their RICO claims and remand the case to the Court of 
Common Pleas of Crawford County.  The District Court granted the 
request and remanded the case to state court.  Trans Penn asked 
for reconsideration, arguing section 301 of the LMRA preempted 
the employees' claims so that federal questions remained even 
after dismissal of the RICO claims.  Trans Penn also claimed the 
employees had alleged unfair labor practices under sections 7 and 
8 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 
& 158 (1988), which protect the rights of employees to organize 
  
without interference from their employer.  Unfair labor practice 
charges must be brought before the National Labor Relations 
Board.  Huge v. Long's Hauling Co., 442 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (W.D. 
Pa. 1977), aff'd, 590 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 
U.S. 918 (1979). 
 The district court denied Trans Penn's motion for 
reconsideration.  McCandless, 840 F. Supp. at 374.  The court 
found that the employees' complaint comprised state law claims 
based on the guarantee, not on the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Id.  The court also accepted the employees' argument 
that they were not raising unfair labor practice claims based on 
Trans Penn's execution of individual contracts, but rather were 
seeking state law tort and contract remedies based on those 
contracts.  Id. at 373.  Therefore, the court found no preemption 
under either the LMRA or the NLRA.  Id. at 373-74. 
 Trans Penn petitions for a writ of mandamus, contending 
the employees' claims substantially depend on an interpretation 
of the collective bargaining agreement between OCAWI and Trans 
Penn and therefore are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.  
Alternatively, if those claims are not preempted, Trans Penn 
characterizes the employees' deletion of their RICO claims as 
"forum shopping" and asserts the district court abused its 
discretion in remanding the case to state court.  Trans Penn does 
not raise the NLRA claim in its petition. 
  
 II. 
  A. 
 We must first address the threshold issue of whether we 
have jurisdiction to address this petition for a writ of 
mandamus.  The power of the courts of appeals to review district 
court remand orders is circumscribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) 
(1988), which states, "[a]n order remanding a case to the State 
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or 
otherwise" with one exception not relevant here.  While the 
language seems straightforward, analysis of § 1447(d) is not 
simple and its bar is not absolute.  As one court has noted, 
"'[s]traightforward' is about the last word judges attach to § 
1447(d) these days . . . ."  In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 
964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992).  
 The Supreme Court has interpreted the bar of § 1447(d) 
narrowly, stating it only applies to remand orders issued under 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c): "[Section 1447(d)] and § 1447(c) must be 
construed together . . . .  This means that only remand orders 
issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified 
therein--that removal was improvident and without jurisdiction--
are immune from review under § 1447(d)."  Thermtron Prods. Inc. 
v. Hermansdorfer 423 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1976).2  In Thermtron, a 
                     
2
.   At the time Thermtron was decided, § 1447(c) provided in 
part: 
 
 If at any time before final judgment it 
appears that the case was removed 
improvidently and without jurisdiction, the 
district court shall remand the case . . . . 
       
  
district court had remanded a case to state court because its 
docket was overloaded, and the Court held review appropriate 
because the remand had been based "on grounds not authorized by 
the removal statutes."  Id. at 353.  The Court allowed review of 
the remand order itself upon petition for a writ of mandamus.  
The Court held that "because an order remanding a removed action 
does not represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal, '[t]he 
remedy in such a case is by mandamus to compel action and not by 
writ of error to review what has been done.'"  Id. at 352-53 
(quoting Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiswall, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 507, 
508 (1875)). 
 Thermtron and its progeny provide jurisdiction for 
appellate courts to review remand orders other than in cases 
removed "improvident[ly] and without jurisdiction."  That is, 
§ 1447(d) bars review of remands that are issued under § 1447(c).  
See PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Bradgate Assocs. v. Fellows, Read & Assocs., 999 F.2d 745, 750 & 
n.4 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Kolibash v. Committee on Legal 
Ethics, 872 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir. 1989); cf. Foster v. Mutual 
Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 48, 50 (3d Cir. 1993).  
The language of § 1447(c) has changed since Thermtron.  It now 
provides for remand based on a procedurally defective removal and 
requires remand "[i]f at any time before final judgment it 
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
(..continued) 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1970). 
  
. . . ."  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1988).3  Thus, Thermtron's holding 
is applicable today to remands based on a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction or for defects in removal procedure.  PAS, 7 F.3d at 
352; In re Amoco, 964 F.2d at 708.   
 Forty years before Thermtron, the Supreme Court had 
created another partial exception to the bar on review in Waco v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934).  In 
Waco, the Supreme Court addressed a case where removal had been 
based on the entry of a diverse third party into the underlying 
dispute.  The district court dismissed the third party and 
remanded for lack of jurisdiction because diversity had been 
destroyed.  Id. at 142.  The Supreme Court held that no appeal 
could lie from the remand order itself, but that "in logic and in 
fact the decree of dismissal preceded that of remand and was made 
by the District Court while it had control of the cause.  
Indisputably this order is the subject of an appeal . . . ."  Id. 
at 143.  The Court in Waco did not create an exception to the bar 
of review of remand orders; it held only that separable decisions 
underlying and preceding the remand could be reviewed.  Id. at 
143-44; see Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking Review of Remands: 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Removal Statute, 43 Emory L.J. 
83, 112 (1994).  Courts of appeals have relied on the Waco 
decision to provide an avenue to review decisions underlying 
remand orders where Thermtron would otherwise seem to bar review 
                     
3
.   For the text of § 1447(c) at the time Thermtron was decided, 
see supra note 2. 
  
altogether (i.e., where the remand was based either on a removal 
defect or because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction).  
See, e.g., Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 224 (3d Cir. 
1993); Mitchell v. Carlson, 896 F.2d 128, 131-33 (5th Cir. 1990); 
Allen v. Ferguson, 791 F.2d 611, 613 & n.3, 614 (7th Cir. 1986).  
We have further extended Waco's holding in some circumstances to 
allow review of the remand order itself in addition to review of 
the underlying decision.  Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 
671, 680 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 Courts of appeals have applied the exceptions to the 
bar of § 1447(d) initiated by Waco and Thermtron to a variety of 
remand situations, such that the bar now governs a fairly narrow 
range of cases.  See, e.g., Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 
F.2d 1207, 1210-11 (3d Cir.) (interpreting Thermtron to mean the 
bar of § 1447(d) applies only to cases remanded on § 1447(c) 
grounds), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 (1991); Baldridge v. 
Kentucky-Ohio Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d 1341, 1345 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(noting decisions that "reflect the prevailing view that § 
1447(d)'s prohibition against appellate review is fairly 
narrow"); 14A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3740, at 237 (Supp. 1994) (observing the Thermtron 
exception, while conceived as narrow, has been applied in 
"numerous decisions").  The two lines of exceptions are 
reasonably distinct, however, both as a matter of theory and as a 
matter of practical impact.  Cases under Thermtron are 
analytically simple: Once the court determines that the remand 
was not pursuant to § 1447(c), the bar of § 1447(d) is 
  
inapplicable and review is appropriate.  Cases following Waco, 
however, are more complex, as the court must first determine 
whether there was a separable decision underlying the remand 
order that preceded the remand order "in logic and in fact," and 
then whether the underlying decision is, in fact, reviewable 
(normally an issue of whether it is final for purposes of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291).  See, e.g., Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 
1352-53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 68 (1993); Powers, 4 
F.3d at 226-31.  The Waco analysis adds further complexity in 
those circumstances where the court can review the remand order 
itself.  See Carr, 17 F.3d at 680. 
 Selecting the appropriate analytical framework has 
proved difficult.  One important element is the timing of the 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as a remand only falls under 
§ 1447(c) if the removal itself was jurisdictionally improper, 
not if the defect arose after removal.  In re Amoco, 964 F.2d at 
708 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 
(1988)); see also Baldridge, 983 F.2d at 1348 & nn.11-12.  Remand 
decisions based on grounds other than (1) that jurisdiction was 
improper at the time of removal or (2) that the removal was 
procedurally defective are therefore reviewable under Thermtron 
as they do not implicate § 1447(c).   
 So many different patterns underlie remand decisions 
that we cannot comprehensively categorize them here.  We can, 
however, set the present case within the remand jurisprudence.  
This case was originally removed based on federal question 
jurisdiction because the complaint included counts alleging RICO 
  
violations.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.  The plaintiffs sought and 
were granted a dismissal of the RICO counts, thus leaving the 
district court with supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1367 (Supp. V 1993).   
 After dismissing the RICO counts, the district court 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remanded the 
case to state court.  We would have had jurisdiction to review 
the remand had defendants petitioned for a writ of mandamus at 
that point.  As the Supreme Court has said, "Section[] . . . 
1447(c) . . . do[es] not apply to cases over which a federal 
court has pendent jurisdiction.  Thus, the remand authority 
conferred by the removal statute and the remand authority 
conferred by the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction overlap not at 
all."  Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 355 n.11.  At least eight 
other circuit courts have agreed, and have held the discretionary 
decision not to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims 
is not a remand under § 1447(c).  Accordingly, they have allowed 
review of remand orders based on the discretionary refusal to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  See Jamison v. Wiley, 14 
F.3d 222, 231-33 (4th Cir. 1994); Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp., 8 
F.3d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Glass, Molders, Pottery, 
Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l, Local No. 173, 983 F.2d 725, 727 
(6th Cir. 1993); Albertson's, Inc. v. Carrigan, 982 F.2d 1478, 
1479-80 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 
F.2d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 1992); J.O. v. Alton Community Unit 
Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 269-71 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Life 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 857 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (8th Cir. 1988); 
  
Price v. PSA, Inc., 829 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).  
 We have allowed review of discretionary remands based 
on the decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction.4  In PAS v. 
Travelers Insurance Co., 7 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 1993), the plaintiff 
brought suit in state court.  Three of its four counts were 
undisputedly governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act ("ERISA") and the defendant removed on that basis.  The 
plaintiff requested that the fourth count, based on state law, be 
remanded to state court.  Defendants claimed the state statutes 
were preempted by ERISA.  Id. at 351. 
 After concluding that the state statutes were not 
preempted by ERISA, the district court exercised its discretion 
to remand the state claim because it involved a "novel and 
complex issue of state law," a basis for remand provided by 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1).  Holding that the state action could become 
dispositive of the federal claims, the district court dismissed 
the federal action without prejudice.  After the district court 
denied defendant's motion for reconsideration, the defendant 
petitioned for a writ of mandamus.  Id. 
  We held in PAS that jurisdiction to review the remand 
decision was proper, notwithstanding § 1447(d).  Id. at 352.  The 
district court's decision was neither for a defect in the removal 
                     
4
.   Indeed, we have held more generally that remands not covered 
by § 1447(c) are not barred from review by § 1447(d).  See, e.g., 
Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1211 (3d Cir. 
1991); Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 1988). 
  
procedure nor for lack of district court subject matter 
jurisdiction, but rather was based on an exercise of the district 
court's discretion to decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction.  Section 1447(c) and (d) therefore did not apply 
and review was proper.  Id.; cf. Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 
F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 1994).5  We then proceeded to consider the 
merits of defendant's claim that ERISA did in fact preempt the 
state law claim.  PAS, 7 F.3d at 354-57. 
 Here, as in PAS, the district court properly removed 
the case based on federal question jurisdiction and exercised its 
discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute6 to remand 
                     
5
.   In Carr, federal jurisdiction was predicated on the joinder 
of the Red Cross, whose federal charter conferred federal 
jurisdiction over cases to which it was a party.  Carr, 17 F.3d 
at 674.  The Red Cross was subsequently dismissed as a party, and 
the district court remanded the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c), as it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  
Id.  Having assumed that § 1447(d) presented a problem for review 
in the first instance, we held the district court's dismissal 
reviewable on appeal based on the Waco exception to § 1447(d) 
combined with the notion that the dismissal was final under the 
collateral final order doctrine.  Id. at 675-77.  We continued by 
deciding that the remand order was also reviewable.  Id. at 680. 
 
 PAS and Carr are two paths to the same result.  While 
in Carr the court assessed the Waco elements of separability and 
then finality for purposes of appeal of the decision which 
underlay the remand order, PAS went by way of the Thermtron 
exception straight to review of the remand order and its 
underlying reasoning.  We think the PAS route, when available, is 
the more felicitous method, and we therefore use it here.  We do 
not intimate any view on how future courts should decide which 
method better serves the particular facts of their cases. 
6
.   Prior to the 1990 enactment of this version of 28 U.S.C. § 
1367, we held, "Absent `extraordinary circumstances,' a district 
court in this circuit is powerless to hear claims lacking an 
independent jurisdictional basis, and `time already invested in 
litigating the state cause of action is an insufficient reason to 
  
the case.  Also in both cases the district court determined the 
state claims were not preempted.  The only difference between 
this case and PAS is that the district court here made the 
preemption decision on a motion for reconsideration after, rather 
than before, it had granted plaintiff's motion for remand.  We 
see no reason why this should require a different result. 
 The timing of the motion for reconsideration, after the 
district court's remand, raises a potential problem for our 
review of the remand order.7  The question is whether after 
(..continued) 
sustain the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.'"  Lovell Mfg. v. 
Export-Import Bank of the United States, 843 F.2d 725, 735 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (quoting Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744, 746 (3d 
Cir. 1982)).  However, in Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware 
County, Pa., 983 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1993), we observed that even 
if Lovell mandated remand of state claims following any dismissal 
of the federal claim: 
 
 Lovell was decided prior to the passage of 
the current version of § 1367.  The language 
in § 1367 expressly contradicts [this] 
reading of Lovell in that it states that 
federal courts shall exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over pendent claims arising out 
of the same case or controversy and may 
decline to exercise jurisdiction if all 
federal claims are dismissed. 
 
Id. at 1285 n.14.  Because at the time of removal "there was a 
colorable federal claim" under RICO, the district court had 
original jurisdiction of that claim, Weaver, 683 F.2d at 747, and 
§ 1367(a) gave the court supplemental jurisdiction over the 
pendent state law claims.  The court retained supplemental 
jurisdiction until it declined to exercise that jurisdiction 
under § 1367(c). 
7
.   We note that were the district court considering preemption 
as a basis to assert jurisdiction in the first instance, the bar 
of § 1447(d) may well apply and it is not clear that the Waco 
exception could be used.  See, e.g., Nutter v. Monongahela Power 
Co., 4 F.3d 319, 321-22 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding where "complete 
preemption was the basis for the district court's jurisdiction, 
  
remand the district court had jurisdiction in order to reconsider 
its remand and whether the preemption issue upon which the motion 
for reconsideration was based is properly before us. 
 The general rule is that a district court loses 
jurisdiction over a case once it has completed the remand by 
sending a certified copy of the remand order to the state court.  
See Hunt v. Acromed Corp., 961 F.2d 1079, 1081 (3d Cir. 1992).   
This view is premised on both the language of § 1447(c) and (d) 
and the need to establish a determinable jurisdictional event 
after which the state court can exercise control over the case 
without fear of further federal interference.  The district court 
is also barred from reconsidering its decision if the remand was 
under § 1447(c) and the case thereby falls under the bar of § 
1447(d).  See, e.g., New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Majoue, 
802 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); FDIC v. Santiago 
Plaza, 598 F.2d 634, 636 (1st Cir. 1979) (per curiam).  But the 
physical mailing of the certified copy is the key jurisdictional 
event to divest the district court of jurisdiction, because a 
remand order is not self-executing.  Hunt, 961 F.2d at 1081 
(citing Bucy v. Nevada Constr. Co., 125 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 
1942)). 
(..continued) 
the court's findings regarding preemption and jurisdiction are 
indistinguishable," and thus § 1447(d) applies to bar review; 
Waco would also not provide an exception to allow review); 
Whitman v. Raley's Inc., 886 F.2d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(holding no review allowed because "[a] remand based on lack of 
'complete preemption' is a remand required by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 
. . . .").  This would present a significant jurisdictional 
problem given the bar to review in § 1447(d), but as we explain 
below it is not the situation we face here. 
  
 The courts of appeals have debated the issue of whether 
a district court can freely reconsider its own remand order when 
the bar of § 1447(d) is not implicated.  Some courts have held a 
district court has jurisdiction to reconsider such a remand order 
within the time for filing an appeal unless the remand is on § 
1447(c) grounds.8  See, e.g., Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 
615-16 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding a remand based on 28 U.S.C. § 
1367 is not a § 1447(c) remand and therefore is not barred by § 
1447(d); such a remand is reviewable by the district court within 
the time for filing an appeal); J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. 
Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 273-74 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
where an exception to the appellate review of remands applies the 
district court also can reconsider its order of remand during the 
time for filing of a notice of appeal). 
 Other courts have construed the district court's 
jurisdiction to reconsider remand orders more narrowly.  In Three 
J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 609 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980), the court held the mere 
entry of the district court's remand order divested it of 
                     
8
.   Where the district court's reconsideration of its own remand 
is appropriate because the bar of § 1447(d) does not apply, some 
courts have been indifferent as to whether a certified copy of 
the remand order was sent.  In re Digicon Marine, Inc., 966 F.2d 
158, 160-61 (5th Cir. 1992).  Thus, the issue of whether a 
certified copy of the remand order has been sent to the state 
court may only be relevant when the bar of § 1447(d) applies.  
See In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1049 (1992).  We need not decide whether 
to follow that view, however, since as we discuss below there is 
no evidence in the record that a certified copy of the remand 
order was sent to the state court. 
  
jurisdiction to reconsider the order.  While the remand fell 
under § 1447(c) and was barred from review by § 1447(d) anyway, 
the court also took a more restrictive view of when the district 
court was divested of jurisdiction.  Similarly, in Santiago Plaza 
the court held § 1447(d) "has been universally construed to 
prohibit even a motion for reconsideration once the state court 
has resumed jurisdiction."  598 F.2d at 636.  The court did not 
discuss the possibility of the Thermtron exception's application, 
nor did it explain the basis for the district court's remand.  
Significantly, both cases were decided shortly after Thermtron 
when neither court had the benefit of the nearly two decades of 
judicial expansion of Thermtron's holding upon which we and other 
courts have been able to draw. 
 Our own precedent is inconclusive on the issue of when 
a district court's jurisdiction to reconsider its own remand 
order ends.  One case, Hunt v. Acromed Corp., 961 F.2d 1079 (3d 
Cir. 1992), appears to take a narrow view of the district court's 
jurisdiction to reconsider a case once it has remanded it.  In 
Hunt, we held the district court lost jurisdiction after sending 
a certified copy of the order of remand to the state court so 
that it could not consider a motion to file an amended notice of 
removal.  961 F.2d at 1082.  We observed that a timely motion to 
reconsider a remand order would be barred after a certified copy 
had been mailed.  Id. at 1082 n.6.  We also observed that while 
the bar of § 1447(d) did not directly apply since the appeal was 
from a denial of a motion to amend the notice of removal and not 
from the removal itself, the policy underlying § 1447(d) was 
  
implicated.  Id. at 1082.  We then noted that "[t]he remand in 
this case could not possibly have been subject to review under an 
exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)."  Id. at 1082 n.9.  Because no 
exception to § 1447(d) applied, Hunt is more analogous to 
Santiago Plaza than to J.O or Thomas (where an exception to 
§ 1447(d) did apply). 
 Thus, where the bar of § 1447(d) applies our precedent 
suggests a district court would lack jurisdiction to reconsider 
its order of remand once a certified copy of the remand order has 
been sent to the state court.  We have not faced the question of 
whether a district court has the power to reconsider a remand 
order either when a certified copy of the order has not yet been 
sent or when the remand itself is not covered by § 1447(d).  In 
this case we have both factors.  There is no evidence in the 
record that a certified copy of the remand order was sent to 
state court,9 cf. J.O., 909 F.2d at 273-74 & n.5 (allowing 
district court to reconsider its remand order during the time for 
filing a notice of appeal when the record shows no evidence a 
certified copy was mailed to the state court), and we have held 
that the initial remand was not covered by § 1447(d). 
 Because this issue has not been squarely presented to 
us before, we look to a persuasive decision from the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Thomas v. LTV Corp, 39 F.3d 611 
(5th Cir. 1994), whose facts are similar to this case.  In 
                     
9
.   The district court's remand order was entered on October 12, 
1993, and on October 29, 1993, Trans Penn filed its motion for 
reconsideration. 
  
Thomas, a union employee who had been fired for poor attendance 
brought suit in state court, alleging breach of contract, 
infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge under 
the Texas Labor Code.  Id. at 614-15.  LTV, the employer, removed 
the case claiming section 301 of the LMRA preempted Thomas' state 
law claims.  Id.  After removal, the district court granted LTV's 
motion for summary judgment on all but the wrongful discharge 
claim, finding the other claims preempted and barred by the 
LMRA's six-month statute of limitations.  Id. at 615.  After the 
district court remanded the wrongful discharge claim to state 
court, LTV filed a motion for reconsideration.  The district 
court changed its mind, held the wrongful discharge claim 
preempted by section 301, and dismissed that claim as well.  Id. 
 Thomas asserted before the court of appeals that the 
district court had no jurisdiction to reconsider its order of 
remand.  Id.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
disagreed, holding because the remand was a discretionary 
decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c), it was not a remand under § 1447(c).  Id.  The court 
held the bar of § 1447(d) did not apply, and therefore the 
district court had jurisdiction to reconsider its order of 
remand.  Id. at 615-16.  We agree with this analysis.  We hold 
the district court here had jurisdiction to reconsider its order 
of remand, first because there is no evidence in the record that 
the district court had sent a certified copy of the remand order 
to the state court, and second because the initial remand was not 
  
covered by § 1447(c) and the bar of § 1447(d) is therefore not 
implicated. 
 In sum, with respect to the rather intricate 
jurisdictional posture of this case, we hold: this case falls 
under the Thermtron exception to § 1447(d)'s bar of review of 
remand orders; we have jurisdiction to review this case on writ 
of mandamus because the order of remand being appealed is not 
final; and even though the district court decided the preemption 
issue on a motion for reconsideration it did not lack 
jurisdiction to make that determination. 
 B. 
 Had we determined this case fell under the Waco line of 
cases we would review the decision underlying the remand order 
(if at all) as an appeal.  Also we would have had to address the 
question of finality, the question of the appropriate standard of 
review of the preemption issue, and whether the remand order 
itself could be reviewed.10  But the appropriate manner of review 
under Thermtron of a remand order is mandamus, and Trans Penn has 
properly petitioned for mandamus rather than filed an appeal.  
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, empowers courts to issue 
"all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."  
The Supreme Court has stated: 
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.    On allowing review of the remand order itself (rather than 
just review of the decision underlying the remand), compare Waco, 
293 U.S. at 143 (holding no review of the order of remand 
allowed), with Carr, 17 F.3d at 680 (holding review of the order 
of remand allowed when the Waco exception applies). 
  
 [B]ecause an order remanding a removed action 
does not represent a final judgment 
reviewable by appeal, "[t]he remedy in such a 
case is by mandamus to compel action, and not 
by writ of error to review what has been 
done."  Absent statutory prohibitions, when a 
remand order is challenged by a petition for 
mandamus in an appellate court, "the power of 
the court to issue the mandamus would be 
undoubted." 
Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 352-53 (citations omitted). 
 A petition for a writ of mandamus must demonstrate the 
district court committed a "clear error of law `at least 
approach[ing] the magnitude of an unauthorized exercise of 
judicial power, or a failure to use that power when there is a 
duty to do so.'"  Richman Bros. Records, Inc. v. U.S. Sprint 
Communications Co., 953 F.2d 1431, 1448 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1069 (3d Cir. 1988)), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3056 (1992).  The writ is an extraordinary 
remedy, only to be used in exceptional circumstances where the 
party seeking it demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to 
the writ.  Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225, 232 
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992).  This 
stringent standard governs our review.  
 
 III. 
 Ordinarily, a case is not removable to federal court 
simply because, as here, the defendant raises federal preemption 
as a defense.  Rather, removal on the basis of federal question 
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1441 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 
generally requires that a federal question be presented on the 
  
face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.  This well-
pleaded complaint rule "makes the plaintiff the master of the 
claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive 
reliance on state law."  Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 
386, 392 (1987).  In certain limited circumstances, however, a 
defendant may be able to remove a case notwithstanding a 
complaint's apparent grounding in state law.  One such 
circumstance occurs when a state-law claim is preempted under 
section 301 of the LMRA.  Id. at 393; see also Goepel v. National 
Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing LMRA preemption), petition for cert. filed, 63 
U.S.L.W. 3574 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1995) (No. 94-1258); Railway Labor 
Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 858 F.2d 936, 
941 (3d Cir. 1988) (same).11   
 Trans Penn contends that plaintiffs' claims in this 
case are, in fact, "completely preempted" in this manner, 
requiring the district court to retain jurisdiction over the case 
because of the implicit federal questions that Trans Penn 
believes are raised on the face of the complaint.  In answer, we 
first discuss the contours of section 301 preemption and then 
evaluate whether plaintiffs' claims are, indeed, preempted. 
 A.  
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.   We have discussed elsewhere the contours of the well-
pleaded complaint rule and its corollary principle, the "complete 
preemption doctrine," and need not duplicate that discussion 
here.  See Goepel, 36 F.3d at 310-11; Railway Labor Executives 
Ass'n, 858 F.2d at 939-42. 
  
 Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
provides for federal jurisdiction over disputes regarding 
collective bargaining agreements, and mandates the application of 
uniform federal law to resolve such disputes.  The statute 
provides: 
 
 Suits for violation of contracts between an 
employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry 
affecting commerce . . . or between any such 
labor organizations, may be brought in any 
district court of the United States having 
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect 
to the amount in controversy or without 
regard to the citizenship of the parties. 
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).  While the provision only explicitly refers 
to federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held "that 
§ 301(a) is more than jurisdictional--that it authorizes federal 
courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of 
these collective bargaining agreements . . . ."  Textile Workers 
Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957) 
(footnote omitted).  The exclusive application of federal law 
serves important national policies: "[Section] 301 mandate[s] 
resort to federal rules of law in order to ensure uniform 
interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements, and thus to 
promote the peaceable, consistent resolution of labor-management 
disputes."  Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 
399, 404 (1988) (footnote omitted).   
 The Supreme Court has set forth a clear "principle of § 
301 pre-emption" to guide our inquiry: 
 [I]f the resolution of a state-law claim 
depends upon the meaning of a collective-
  
bargaining agreement, the application of 
state law (which might lead to inconsistent 
results since there could be as many state-
law principles as there are States) is pre-
empted and federal labor-law principles--
necessarily uniform throughout the Nation--
must be employed to resolve the dispute. 
Id. at 405-06.  The preeminence of federal law in interpreting 
collective bargaining agreements applies to tort as well as 
contract actions.  In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 
202, 210-11 (1985), the Court held "the pre-emptive effect of § 
301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations," to 
"questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement 
agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from 
breaches of that agreement," whether such questions arise in a 
tort or contract suit.  Thus, where a plaintiff sued his 
employer, Allis-Chalmers, in tort for the bad-faith handling of 
his insurance claims and his insurance policy was incorporated by 
reference in the collective bargaining agreement between the 
plaintiff's union and his employer, the court held section 301 
preempted the tort claims.  The Court reasoned, "It is a question 
of federal contract interpretation whether there was an 
obligation under this labor contract to provide the payments in a 
timely manner, and, if so, whether Allis-Chalmers' conduct 
breached that implied contract provision."  Id. at 215. 
 At the same time, the mere existence of a collective 
bargaining agreement does not prevent an individual from bringing 
state law claims based on some independent agreement or 
obligation.  The plaintiffs in Caterpillar had been hired for 
  
positions covered by a collective bargaining agreement but later 
assumed management and other positions outside the bargaining 
unit.  At that time, Caterpillar allegedly made statements to the 
plaintiffs guaranteeing their employment, and when it later 
downgraded the plaintiffs to unionized positions it assured them 
these positions were temporary.  When Caterpillar later laid off 
the plaintiffs, they sued claiming breach of the individual 
employment contracts. 
   The Supreme Court held "a plaintiff covered by a 
collective-bargaining agreement is permitted to assert legal 
rights independent of that agreement, including state-law 
contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a 
collective-bargaining agreement."12  Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 
396.  The Court observed the plaintiffs' complaint neither relied 
on the collective bargaining agreement indirectly nor addressed 
the relationship between the individual contracts and the 
agreement.  Id. at 395.  The Court also noted that individual 
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.  The Court had noted this limit on § 301 in Allis-Chalmers: 
 
  Of course, not every dispute concerning 
employment, or tangentially involving a 
provision of a collective-bargaining 
agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other 
provisions of the federal labor law. . . . 
[I]t would be inconsistent with congressional 
intent under that section to pre-empt state 
rules that proscribe conduct, or establish 
rights and obligations, independent of a 
labor contract. 
 
471 U.S. at 211-212. 
  
employment contracts could not subtract from collective 
agreements but they could create additional rights.  Id. at 396. 
 Furthermore, a plaintiff may bring a state law tort 
action against an employer, even where he could have brought a 
similar claim based on a provision in his collective bargaining 
agreement, so long as the state claim does not require 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.  The tort 
claim falls under state law even though the claim based on the 
bargaining agreement provision must apply federal law pursuant to 
section 301.  In Lingle, 486 U.S. at 401, the plaintiff notified 
her employer she had been injured in the course of her employment 
and requested workers' compensation for medical expenses, but the 
employer discharged her for allegedly filing a false worker's 
compensation claim.  Her union filed a grievance under a 
collective bargaining agreement provision protecting employees 
from discharge except for "proper" or "just" cause, and she filed 
a retaliatory discharge action in an Illinois state court.  Id. 
at 401-02.  The employer removed the action to federal district 
court and filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to section 
301. 
 The Court held section 301 did not preempt the state 
law retaliatory discharge claim because it could be resolved 
without interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.  
Id. at 407.  The issues raised--whether the employee was 
discharged or threatened with discharge to deter her from 
exercising her legal rights--were "purely factual questions 
pertain[ing] to the conduct of the employee and the conduct and 
  
motivation of the employer."  Id.  It did not matter, the Court 
said, that the claim under the collective bargaining agreement 
would involve the same factual issues, for the state law claim 
was "`independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement in the 
sense of `independent' that matters for § 301 pre-emption 
purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require 
construing the collective-bargaining agreement."  Id.   
 We followed this precedent in Berda v. CBS, Inc., 881 
F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990), where 
we allowed an employee to bring state contract, promissory 
estoppel, and tort claims against his employer based on alleged 
misrepresentations made before the employee became a member of 
the bargaining unit.  Berda, 881 F.2d at 20.  The plaintiff 
claimed the employer violated its oral promises of job security 
by laying him off.  We found his claims did not "substantially 
depend" on the interpretation of a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Id. at 25.  Rather, they were based on the oral 
agreement, which could create rights in addition to those under 
the bargaining agreement.  We noted that it was of no 
significance that the alleged misrepresentations in the oral 
statements related to layoffs, and layoffs were referred to in 
the bargaining agreement, so long as the plaintiff did not need 
to refer to the bargaining agreement in making his claims.  Id. 
at 27.   
 B.  
 We now turn to the employees' particular claims, which 
Trans Penn asserts are inextricably intertwined with and 
  
substantially dependent on the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  At the outset, we reject Trans Penn's general 
contention that because the "foundation" of plaintiffs' state 
tort and contract claims--job security in the face of layoffs or 
discharge--is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under 
federal labor law and is covered in their bargaining agreement, 
the claims are preempted.13  The employees have not alleged Trans 
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.  Trans Penn seeks support for this proposition in Angst v. 
Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530 (3d Cir. 1992), and Darden v. 
United States Steel Corp., 830 F.2d 1116 (11th Cir. 1987).  
Neither case, however, does more than apply the standard rule 
that § 301 preempts claims either founded directly on rights 
created by a collective bargaining agreement or substantially 
dependent upon an analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.  
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987). 
 
 In Angst, employees brought suit against Mack Trucks 
alleging a violation of a "buy-out plan" Mack Trucks and the 
employees negotiated as a modification of their collective 
bargaining agreement.  969 F.2d at 1535.  Because the state law 
claims depended on interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement and its modifications, the claims were preempted by § 
301.  Id. at 1536-37.  While we distinguished Caterpillar and 
Berda because "the aggrieved employees [in those cases] were not 
represented by a union and thus were not subject to collectively 
bargained labor agreements," id. at 1537, we did not indicate 
that all claims arising while an individual is subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement are preempted by § 301.  The tort 
claim in Lingle, for example, arose while the employee was 
represented by a union, and the collective bargaining agreement 
provided her with a grievance procedure to address her claim.  
Lingle, 486 U.S. at 401-02. 
 
 Similarly, the Darden court found § 301 preemption 
after finding the employees' claims required examination of the 
collective bargaining agreement. The court noted that "plaintiffs 
actually allege a violation of the collective bargaining 
agreement in their complaints.  Having done so, it is 
disingenuous for them now to maintain that their claims are not 
'inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the 
labor contract.'"  Darden, 830 F.2d at 1120 (quoting Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985)). 
  
Penn violated the terms and conditions of the collective 
bargaining agreement.  While the state law claims here relate to 
job security, they are grounded in the guarantee given the 
employees by Trans Penn.14  The collective bargaining agreement 
does not mention the individual employment contracts, nor does 
Trans Penn explain how the claims are substantially dependent on 
analysis of the collective bargaining agreement.  The fact that 
job security is addressed in the collective bargaining agreement 
is "of no consequence, because [the employees] need not refer to 
. . . the collective bargaining agreement in order to make out 
[their] claim."  Berda, 881 F.2d at 27.   
 Berda, Caterpillar, and Lingle show that "there is 
nothing novel about recognizing that substantive rights in the 
labor relations context can exist without interpreting 
collective-bargaining agreements."  Lingle, 486 U.S. at 411.  Our 
examination of the employees' contract, fraud, and emotional 
distress claims demonstrates they assert substantive rights 
independent of the collective bargaining agreement. 
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.  We have stated, "[E]mployees who are members of a collective 
bargaining unit cannot negotiate individual contracts that are 
inconsistent with the . . . collective bargaining agreement."  
Malia v. RCA Corp., 794 F.2d 909, 912 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 482 U.S. 927 (1987).  However, in Malia we held an 
employee could sue under state law based on an oral labor 
contract he negotiated while a member of a collective bargaining 
unit.  We stated, "Nothing in the LMRA prevents an individual--
whether that individual is to be newly hired or promoted from a 
bargaining unit--from negotiating an employment contract for a 
management position."  Malia, 794 F.2d at 913.  Similarly, 
nothing in the LMRA prevents an individual from negotiating a 
contract to take effect after the termination of a collective 
bargaining agreement. 
  
 1. Breach of Contract 
 The employees charge Trans Penn breached the guarantee 
contracts when it dismissed them on October 30, 1991.15  Trans 
Penn contends that adjudication of the employees' contract claims 
requires an analysis and interpretation of the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
 The employees may assert legal rights, including state 
law contract rights, provided they are independent of the 
collective bargaining agreement.  Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 396.  
Here, the employees allege Trans Penn violated its duties and 
responsibilities under the separate guarantee to provide 
continued employment.  The duties claimed to be owed to Trans 
Penn employees are firmly rooted in the separate guarantee, not 
the collective bargaining agreement. 
 Under Pennsylvania law, "[i]n order to recover for 
damages pursuant to a breach of contract, the plaintiff must show 
a causal connection between the breach and the loss."  Logan v. 
Mirror Printing Co., 600 A.2d 225, 226 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) 
(citing Exton Drive-In, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 261 A.2d 319 
(Pa. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970)).  Where one party 
to a contract breaches without any legal justification, the non-
breaching party may receive whatever damages it suffered (unless 
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.   The complaint states, "Plaintiffs believe and therefore 
aver that their termination from employment with Defendants did 
not result from any diminution in Defendants' business sufficient 
to justify termination under the terms of the Contract."  First 
Am. Compl. ¶ 26.  The "Contract" refers to the guarantee, not the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
  
the contract provides otherwise) if: "(1) [the damages] were such 
as would naturally and ordinarily result from the breach, or (2) 
[the damages] were reasonably foreseeable and within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract, 
and (3) [the damages] can be proved with reasonable certainty."  
Logan, 600 A.2d at 226 (citing Taylor v. Kaufhold, 84 A.2d 347, 
351 (Pa. 1951)).   
 Considering these factors, assessing contract liability 
under Pennsylvania law will not require an analysis or 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.  "Section 
301 says nothing about the content or validity of individual 
employment contracts."  Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394.  Rather, 
these are issues to be resolved under state law. 
 2. Fraud 
 Trans Penn insists section 301 preempts the employees' 
fraud claims16 because proof of fraud requires clear and 
convincing evidence of justifiable reliance by the recipient upon 
the misrepresentation.  Such an analysis, Trans Penn argues, 
requires an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement 
to determine if the employees justifiably relied on 
representations guaranteeing job security.  We do not agree. 
 Pennsylvania law requires the plaintiff alleging fraud 
to prove the following elements by clear and convincing evidence: 
                     
16
.   The employees allege, in part, "[Trans Penn] knowing the 
same to be false and misleading when made, and never intending to 
honor same, . . . intentionally, recklessly, [and] maliciously 
. . . represented and promised job security [for the purpose of 
inducing the work force to decertify the union]."  Id. ¶ 35. 
  
"(1) a misrepresentation; (2) a fraudulent utterance of it; (3) 
the maker's intent that the recipient be induced thereby to act; 
(4) the recipient's justifiable reliance on the 
misrepresentation; and (5) damage to the recipient proximately 
caused."  Seven v. Kelshaw, 611 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992). 
 We conclude that the employees need not depend on the 
collective bargaining agreement to satisfy these elements of 
state law fraud.  This is not a situation, as in Allis-Chalmers, 
where the alleged tort is a violation of duties assumed in the 
collective bargaining agreement.  471 U.S. at 215.  An 
examination of the employer's behavior, motivation, and 
statements does not substantially depend upon the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement.  The essence of the employees' 
case is proof of justifiable reliance on the separate guarantees, 
not on the collective bargaining agreements.  As in Lingle, 486 
U.S. at 407, "[e]ach of these purely factual questions pertains 
to the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of 
the employer," and may be appropriately resolved under state law. 
 3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 Trans Penn maintains resolution of the employees' claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires an 
analysis of the collective bargaining agreement because the terms 
of that agreement, "which gave the plaintiffs seniority benefits 
and protection from arbitrary discharge, provide the context 
against which the relative effects of the `Guarantee' and 
subsequent layoffs must be measured."  Appellants' Br. at 20 
  
(citation omitted).  Furthermore, Trans Penn asserts that 
assessing the "outrageousness" of these facts requires analysis 
of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.17  Id.  We 
disagree. 
 Pennsylvania courts recognize a cause of action under 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46 (1965) for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.18  Field v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1183-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1989).  To prevail, plaintiff must prove defendant, by extreme 
and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly caused 
plaintiff severe emotional distress.  Motheral v. Burkhart, 583 
A.2d 1180, 1188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).  Liability will be found 
only where "the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and 
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable 
in a civilized community."  Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 46 cmt. d). 
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.   The employees' complaint alleges "the conduct of the 
Defendants with respect to this Plaintiff was intentional, 
wanton, malicious, reckless and outrageous.  As a direct and 
proximate result of the conduct . . . this Plaintiff has suffered 
great, severe and actual mental distress and chronic depression 
. . . ."  Id. ¶¶ 47 & 48. 
18
.  The Restatement provides: 
 
 (1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability  for such emotional distress, and 
if bodily harm to the other results from it, 
for such bodily harm. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). 
  
 We fail to see how evaluating Trans Penn's conduct 
requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement 
and substantially depends on its construction.  The same is true 
for the employees' allegation that they suffered severe mental 
distress--the analysis under state law will only focus on Trans 
Penn's conduct while inducing the employees to enter into the 
"Guarantee" agreement and on the employees' response.  This 
factual inquiry does not implicate any analysis of terms or 
rights created by the collective bargaining agreement.  See 
Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407. 
 IV. 
 Because we conclude that the employees' claims are not 
preempted under section 301, we turn to Trans Penn's alternative 
argument.  Trans Penn characterizes the employees' deletion of 
their RICO claims as "forum manipulation" and contends the 
district court abused its discretion in remanding back to the 
Court of Common Pleas. 
 It is settled that district courts have discretion to 
remand to state court "a removed case involving pendent claims 
upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the 
case would be inappropriate."  Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 
484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988).  In deciding whether to remand, the 
district court should consider what best serves the principles of 
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.  Id.   Of course, the 
district court can consider whether the plaintiff has engaged in 
any manipulative tactics.  Therefore, an effort by the plaintiff 
  
to manipulate the forum should be considered along with other 
factors in the decision whether to remand.  Id. 
 The employees note that they propounded and served 
interrogatories and requests for production on the defendants 
seeking evidence to substantiate their RICO claims.  They say 
they withdrew the RICO claims because the responses to these 
discovery requests proved inadequate to substantiate these 
claims.  
 The district court held, "Taking into consideration the 
values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity, we 
do not believe that the present case should remain within our 
jurisdiction."  McCandless, 840 F. Supp. at 374.  The court also 
described the employees' assertions as "resulting from what they 
perceived as a valid, enforceable employment contract which was 
allegedly fraudulent."  Id.  The district court then concluded, 
"This is not an action to challenge the conduct of the employer 
to coerce anti-union votes.  It is an action for damages for 
breach of contract, and therefore, is better suited to be 
adjudicated by the Pennsylvania courts."  Id. 
 We believe that the district court acted within its 
sound discretion in remanding the case to the state court. 
 V. 
 Trans Penn has not demonstrated a clear and 
undisputable right to mandamus.  Section 301 preempts the 
application of state law only if the application substantially 
depends on an interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  In concluding the employees' claims were not 
  
preempted and remanding them, the district court neither engaged 
in the unauthorized use of judicial power nor abused its 
discretion.  Trans Penn has failed to satisfy the stringent 
standard necessary to issue a writ of mandamus. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Trans Penn's 
petition for a writ of mandamus. 
